This weekend I am attending the Annual Conference of the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES). On Saturday afternoon, I will present a paper on the use of presidential vetoes in authoritarian regimes as part of a panel on executive politics in the former Soviet Union.
Panel: Executive politics in the former Soviet Union
Chair: Ben Noble (University of Oxford)
- Fabian Burkhardt (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) ‘The institutional presidency and the power vertical: regime stabilization by institutionalization of the presidential administration in the Russian Federation 1994-2012’
- Ellie Martus (University of New South Wales) ‘Executive involvement in the Russian environmental policy process’
- Ben Noble (University of Oxford) ‘Ministers with the Initiative: Russian Ministries as Actors in the Law-making Process’
- Philipp Köker (Canterbury Christ Church University) ‘Presidential veto power in authoritarian regimes’
- Julian Waller (George Washington University) ‘Building a Proper Presidential Majority: Federal and Regional Executive Preference for Russian SMD Candidates’
After the success of my panel on presidential vetoes at the ECPR General Conference in Prague this year, I am once again organising panels as part of the Presidential Politics section for the ECPR General Conference 2017 in Oslo (6-9 September).
Please email paper abstracts (max. 300 words) for inclusion in the panels to Philipp Köker (firstname.lastname@example.org) by Monday, 6 February 2017.
1. Presidents and legislation: Policymaking consequences of presidential veto power
The presidents’ legislative veto has traditionally attracted great scholarly attention and scholars have been able to identify common predictors of its use across political systems. This research now provides the basis for a shift of scholarly focus from explaining general patterns of presidential veto use to more bill-specific theoretical and statistical models of presidential involvement in the legislative process. This panel invites submissions that push the boundaries of current research on presidential vetoes and presidents’ involvement in legislation (e.g. through judicial review requests or legislative initiatives) irrespective of methodological (quantitative/qualitative) or theoretical approach. Both case studies of individual countries and/or specific mechanisms as well as comparative research and theoretical papers are welcome.
Full call for papers under this link.
2. The role of presidents in the recent EU crises
Throughout the recent European crises, presidents have emerged as exceedingly vocal actors in a number of countries where they normally do not play a leading executive role. Starting with the Eurozone crisis in 2008 and the subsequent austerity policies, presidential action has been provoked by a number of international factors. The aim of the Panel is to analyse the context and consequences of these interpellations and interventions in which presidents – despite often limited in formal prerogatives – have gone beyond established roles and constitutional practice in a bid to influence the management of European crises at national and international level. This panel welcomes contributions that look at cases individually or comparatively and embed their analyses in the wider literature on political leadership, agenda-setting and European Union studies.
Full call for papers under this link.
This year I am organising a panel on presidential veto power in comparative perspective for the section “Presidential Politics. Powers and Constraints in Comparative Perspective” organised by the ECPR Standing Group on Presidents at the ECPR General Conference in Prague, 7-10 September 2016. I am still looking for contributors to the panel, so please get in touch if you would like to contribute.
Presidents are now the most common type of head of state in democracies around the world. Although the role of the presidency varies greatly from country to country, even the least powerful presidents possess some power that allows them to influence the political process. The common and most frequently used power is the right to veto. The majority of presidents around the world can return bills to parliament for reconsideration, and the mere threat to use their power can bring work on bills to a halt.
Yet there is great variation in stipulations and customs governing both the formal and informal veto power of presidents. Some presidents merely dispose of a block veto that can be overridden by a simple majority, while others can suggest changes to bills and impose their will on the legislature by the ways of super majorities required for overriding their veto. Even without being formally vested with such constitutional prerogatives, presidents have found ways to significantly delay or prevent the implementation of parliamentary or governmental decisions.
Apart from a wealth of studies on U.S.-American presidents, presidential veto use tends to be understudied both empirically (e.g. veto use and its determinants) and theoretically (developing new or advancing existing approaches). The aim of this panel is to shed light on and examine different facets of presidential veto power within and beyond constitutional stipulations. It presents comparative papers and country studies on presidential veto power in Latin America and the USA, Western and Central Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
It particularly welcomes proposals for comparative papers, irrespective of the chosen methodological approach (quantitative or qualitative). Potential topics include but are not limited to:
- the determinants of presidential veto use
- the development of veto use over time
- the consequences of formal and informal veto power and its use
- vetoes and amendatory observations to legislation
- new or improved theoretical models of presidential veto power
Please email your abstracts (300 words) for inclusion in the panel to Philipp Köker (p [dot] koeker [at] ucl.ac.uk) by Friday, 5th February 2016.